Texas act of stipulating that only those who have previously served two years as freight train conductors or brakemen shall be eligible to serve as railroad train conductors was arbitrary and effected a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Justices dissenting: McKenna, Pitney. Accord: International Harvester Co. Kentucky , U. South Carolina law making mental anguish resulting from negligent non-delivery of a telegram a cause of action could not be invoked to support an action for negligent non-delivery in the District of Columbia, an area beyond the jurisdiction of South Carolina and, consistent with due process, removed from the scope of its legislative power. The statute, as applied to messages sent from South Carolina to another jurisdiction, also was an invalid regulation of interstate commerce.
Oklahoma Separate Coach Law violated the Equal Protection Clause by permitting carriers to provide sleeping, dining, and chair cars for whites but not for Negroes.
Justices concurring: White separately , C. A South Dakota law that required a foreign corporation to appoint a local agent to accept service of process as a condition precedent to suing in state courts to collect a claim arising out of interstate commerce imposed an invalid burden on said commerce. An Oklahoma privilege tax, insofar as it was levied on sale of coal extracted from lands owned by Indian tribes and leased on their behalf by the Federal Government, was invalid as a tax on federal instrumentality.
Justices dissenting: Day, Hughes, Holmes separately. Tennessee county privilege tax law, insofar as it was enforced as to a liquor dealer doing a strictly mail-order business confined to shipments to outofstate destinations was void as a burden on interstate commerce. North Dakota law compelling carriers to haul certain commodities at less than compensatory rates deprived them of property without due process.
Justice dissenting: Pitney. A West Virginia law that compelled carriers to haul passengers at noncompensatory rates deprived them of property without due process. Justices dissenting: Hughes, Pitney, McReynolds. Wisconsin statute requiring interstate trains to stop at villages of a specified number of inhabitants, without regard to the volume of business done there, was void as imposing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
Accord: Mayers v. Anderson , U. A Wisconsin statute that compelled sleeping car companies, if an upper berth was not sold, to accord use of the space to the purchaser of a lower berth, took salable property from the owner without compensation and therefore deprived the owner of property without due process of law. Justices dissenting: McKenna, Holmes.
An Arizona statute that compelled establishments hiring five or more workers to reserve 80 percent of the employment opportunities to U. Justice dissenting: McReynolds. Kentucky statute levying tax, in the nature of a license tax for the doing of local business, on premiums collected in New York by a foreign insurance company after it had ceased to do business in that state violated due process because it affected activities beyond the jurisdiction of the state.
Texas statute imposing special licenses on express companies maintaining offices for C. A Louisiana law that established a rebuttable presumption that any person systematically purchasing sugar in Louisiana at a price below that which he paid in any other state was a party to a monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because it declared an individual presumptively guilty of a crime and exempted countless others paying the same price.
A Wisconsin law that revoked the license of any foreign corporation that removed to a federal court a suit instituted against it by a Wisconsin citizen imposed an unconstitutional condition. Construction of acts of and as compelling a Detroit City Railway to extend its lines to suburban areas annexed by Detroit only on the same terms as were contained in its initial franchise as authorized by the Detroit ordinance of , wherein its fare was fixed, operated to impair the obligation of contract.
Justices dissenting: Clarke, Brandeis. The two-cent passenger rate fixed by act of the Arkansas legislature was confiscatory and accordingly deprived the railroad of its property without due process. A Tennessee privilege tax could not validly be imposed on interstate sales consummated at either destination in Tennessee by an Indiana corporation that, for the purpose of filling orders taken by its salesmen in Tennessee, shipped thereto a tank car of oil and a carload of barrels and filled the orders through an agent who drew the oil from the tank car into the barrels, or into barrels furnished by customers, and then made delivery and collected the agreed price, and thereafter moved the two cars to another point in Tennessee for effecting like deliveries.
A Washington law that proscribed private employment agencies by prohibiting them from collecting fees for their services deprived individuals of the liberty to pursue a lawful calling contrary to due process of law.
Kentucky act of , amending act of and construed in such manner as to enable a county to avoid collection of taxes to repay judgment on unpaid bonds impaired the obligation of contract. A Texas law that, under the guise of taxing the privilege of doing an intrastate business, imposed on an Illinois corporation a license tax based on its authorized capital stock, was void not only as imposing a burden on interstate commerce, but also as contravening the Due Process Clause by affecting property outside the jurisdiction of Texas.
Pennsylvania gross receipts tax on wholesalers, as applied to a merchant who sold part of his merchandise to customers in foreign countries either as the result of orders received directly from them or as the result of orders solicited by agents abroad was void as a regulation of foreign commerce and as a duty on exports.
License fee or excise of a given per cent of the par value of the entire authorized capital stock of a foreign corporation doing both a local and interstate business and owning property in several States was a tax on the entire business and property of the corporation and was void both as an illegal burden on interstate commerce and as a violation of due process by reason of affecting property beyond the borders of the taxing State.
When a Connecticut corporation maintains and employs a Massachusetts office with a stock of samples and an office force and traveling salesmen merely to obtain local orders subject to confirmation at the Connecticut office and with deliveries to be made directly from the latter, its business was interstate commerce and a Massachusetts annual excise could not be validly applied thereto. Liberty of contract, as protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, precluded enforcement of the Missouri nonforfeiture statute, prescribing how net value of a life insurance policy is to be applied to avert a forfeiture in the event the annual premium is not paid, so as to prevent a Missouri resident from executing in the New York office of the insurer a different agreement sanctioned by New York law whereby the policy was pledged as security for a loan and later canceled in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Day, Pitney, Clarke. Georgia act of revoking a grant in of a perpetual right of way to a railroad impaired the obligation of contract Art. Kentucky law, insofar as it authorized a judgment against nonresident individuals based on service against their Kentucky agent after his appointment had expired, violated due process.
Tax exemptions in charters granted to certain railroads inured to their lessee, and, accordingly, a Georgia tax authorized by a constitutional provision postdating such charters and imposed on the leasehold interest of the lessee impaired the obligation of contract.
Justices dissenting: Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke. Tennessee act that made the annual tax for the privilege of doing railway construction work dependent on whether the person taxed had his chief office in Tennessee, i. New York income tax law that allowed exemptions to residents, with increases for married persons and dependents but that allowed no equivalent exemptions to nonresidents abridged the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. The Oklahoma constitution and laws, under which an order of the State Corporation Commission declaring a laundry a monopoly and limiting its rates was not judicially reviewable, and that compelled litigant, for purposes of obtaining a judicial test of rates, to disobey the order and invite serious penalty for each day of refusal pending completion of judicial appeal, violated due process insofar as rates were enforced by penalties.
An Illinois law denying Illinois courts jurisdiction in actions for wrongful death occurring in another state, which was construed to bar jurisdiction of actions on a sister state judgment founded upon a like cause, was as so applied, in violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. New Mexico law levying annual license on distributors of gasoline plus 2 cents per gallon on all gasoline sold was a privilege tax, and, as applied to parties who bring gasoline from without and sell it in New Mexico, imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar as it related to their business of selling in tank car lots and in barrels or packages as originally imported.
North Dakota act, as administered, imposed invalid burden on interstate commerce and took property without due process by reason of taxing an interstate railroad by assessing the value of its property in the state at that proportion of the total value of its stock and bonds that the main track mileage within the state bore to the main track mileage of the entire line; this formula was indefensible inasmuch as the cost of construction per mile was within than without the taxing state, and the large and valuable terminals of the railroad were located elsewhere.
Action of Ohio legislature ratifying proposed Eighteenth Amendment could not be referred to the voters, and the provisions of the Ohio constitution requiring such referendum were inconsistent with Article V of the Federal Constitution.
Accord: Hawke v. Smith No. Since Pennsylvania Public Service Commission Law failed to provide opportunity by way of appeal to the courts or by injunctive proceedings to test issue as to whether rates fixed by Commission are confiscatory, order of Commission establishing maximum future rates violated due process of law. Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke. A Virginia law that taxed all income of local corporation derived from business within and without Virginia, while exempting entirely income derived outside of Virginia by local corporations that did no local business, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Holmes. Justices dissenting: Pitney, McReynolds. Justice dissenting: Clarke. Arkansas statute that authorized local assessments for road improvements denied equal protection of the laws insofar as railroad property was burdened for local improvement on a basis totally different from that used for measuring the contribution demanded of individual owners. Justices dissenting: Clarke, Pitney, Brandeis.
Accord: United Fuel Gas Co. Hallanan , U. Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Clarke. A Kentucky law prescribing conditions under which foreign corporations could do business in that state, and that precluded enforcement in Kentucky courts of contracts made by foreign corporations not complying with such conditions, could not be enforced against Tennessee corporation that sued in a Kentucky court for breach of a contract consummated in that state for the purchase of grain to be delivered to and used in Tennessee; such transaction was in interstate commerce, notwithstanding that the Tennessee purchaser might change its mind after delivery to a carrier in Kentucky and sell the grain in Kentucky or consign it to some other place in Kentucky.
An Arizona statute that regulated injunctions in labor disputes, but exempted ex-employees, when committing tortious injury to the business of their former employer in the form of mass picketing, libelous utterances, and inducement of customers to withhold patronage, while leaving subject to injunctive restraint all other tortfeasors engaged in like wrongdoing, deprived the employer of property without due process and denied him equal protection of the law.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Pitney, Clarke, Brandeis. An Oklahoma income tax law could not validly be enforced as to net income of lessee derived from the sales of his share of oil and gas received under leases of restricted Indian lands which constituted him in effect an instrumentality used by the United States in fulfilling its duties to the Indians. An Arkansas law that revoked the license of a foreign corporation to do business in that state whenever it resorted to the federal courts sitting in that state exacted an unconstitutional condition.
A North Dakota statute that required purchasers of grain to obtain a license to act under a defined system of grading, inspection, and weighing, and to abide by regulations as to prices and profits imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar as it was applied to a North Dakota association which bought grain in the state and loaded it promptly on cars for shipment to other states for sale, notwithstanding occasional diversion of the grain for local sales.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke. Rates fixed for the sale of gas by New York statute were confiscatory and deprived the utility of its property without due process of law.
Accord: Newton v. New York Gas Co. Kings County Lighting Co. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. Consolidated Gas Co. A Florida law retroactively validating collection of fee for passage through a canal, the use of which was then free by law, was ineffective; a legislature could not retroactively approve what it could not lawfully do. A Georgia law levying inspection fees and providing for inspection of oil and gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to gasoline and oil in interstate commerce; for the fees clearly exceeded the cost of inspection and amounted to a tariff levied without the consent of Congress.
An Arkansas law exacting of persons insuring property in Arkansas a five-percent tax on amounts paid on premiums to insurers not authorized to do business in Arkansas violated due process insofar as it was applied to insurance contracted and paid for outside Arkansas by a foreign corporation doing a local business.
A Vermont levy of a property tax on logs under control of the owner which, in the course of their interstate journey, were being temporarily detained by a boom to await subsidence of high waters and for the sole purpose of saving them from loss, was void as a burden on interstate commerce. A Pennsylvania law that forbade mining in such a way as to cause subsidence of any human habitation or public street or building and which thereby made commercially impracticable the removal of valuable coal deposits was deemed arbitrary and amounted to a deprivation of property without due process.
As applied to an owner of land who, prior to this enactment, had validly deeded the surface with express reservation of right to remove coal underneath and subject to waiver by grantee of damage claims resulting from such mining, said law also impaired the obligation of contract.
Justice dissenting: Brandeis. A South Carolina statute, as construed, that sought to convert a covenant in a prior legislative contract into a condition subsequent, and to impose as a penalty for its violation the forfeiture of valuable property, impaired the obligation of contract. A first mortgage executed to a Federal Land Bank is a federal instrumentality and cannot be subjected to an Alabama recording tax.
An Ohio law that applied to interstate and intrastate commerce, and that exacted fees for inspection of petroleum products in excess of the legitimate cost of inspection, imposed an invalid import tax to the extent that the excess could not be separated and assigned solely to intrastate commerce.
Insofar as drainage district tax authorized under an Arkansas law imposed upon a railroad a levy disproportionate to the value of the benefits derived from an improvement, the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. A Minnesota law that provided that interstate railroads that had an agent in Minnesota to solicit traffic over lines outside Minnesota may be served with summons by delivery of copy of it to the agent imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce as applied to a carrier that owned and operated no facilities in Minnesota and that was sued by a plaintiff who did not reside in Minnesota on a cause of action arising outside the state.
A Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of any language other than English in any school, private, denominational, or public, maintaining classes for the first eight grades denied liberty without due process of law. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Sutherland.
Accord: Bartels v. Iowa , U. A similar Iowa law violates due process. Same division of Justices as in Meyer v. A Georgia law that extended corporate limits of a town and that, as judicially construed, had the effect of rendering applicable to the added territory street railway rates fixed by an earlier contract between the town and the railway impaired the obligation of that contract by adding to its burden.
Accord: Dorchy v. Kansas , U. Industrial Court , U. A Wisconsin law that required a foreign corporation not doing business in Wisconsin, or having property there, other than that sought to be recovered in a suit, to send, as a condition precedent to maintaining such action, its officer with corporate records pertinent to the matter in controversy, and to submit to an adversary examination before answer, but which did not subject nonresident individuals to such examination, except when served with notice and subpoena within Wisconsin, and then only in the court where the service was had, and which limited such examinations, in the case of residents of Wisconsin, individual or corporate, to the county of their residence violated the Equal Protection Clause.
A West Virginia law that required pipe line companies to fill all local needs before endeavoring to export any natural gas extracted in West Virginia was void as a prohibited interference with interstate commerce. Washington state and county property taxes cannot be levied on the property of a corporation that, though formed under Washington law, was a federal instrumentality created and operated by the United States as an instrument of war. A Louisiana license tax law could not validly be enforced as to the business of companies employed as agents by owners of vessels engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce when the services performed by the agents consisted of the soliciting and engaging of cargo, and the nomination of vessels to carry it, etc.
See Texas Transp. New Orleans, U. A Texas law that permitted a nonresident to prosecute a case which arose outside of Texas against a railroad corporation of another state, which was engaged in interstate commerce and neither owned nor operated facilities in Texas, was inoperative because it burdened interstate commerce. As imposed, the tax also violated the Equal Protection Clause. A Michigan law that converted an interstate contract motor carrier into a public utility by legislative fiat in effect took property for public use without compensation in violation of the due process clause, and also imposed unreasonable conditions on the right to carry on interstate commerce.
A Washington law that prohibited motor vehicle common carriers for hire from using its highways without obtaining a certificate of convenience could not validly be exacted of an interstate motor carrier; the law was not a regulation designed to promote public safety but a prohibition of competition and, accordingly, burdened interstate commerce.
Accord: Bush Co. Maloy , U. Accord: Allen v. Galveston Truck Line Corp. A Massachusetts law that imposed excise tax on foreign corporations doing business in the state, measured by a combination of the total value of capital shares attributable to transactions therein and the proportion of net income attributable to such transactions, could not validly be applied to a foreign corporation which transacted only as interstate business therein.
The tax as here imposed also violated due process by affecting property beyond Massachusetts borders. Oregon Compulsory Education Law that required every parent to send his child to a public school was an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children and violated due process.
An Arkansas statute that imposed special assessment on lands acquired by private owners from the United States on account of benefits resulting from road improvements completed before the United States parted with title effected a taking of property without due process of law. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Stone. A Pennsylvania law that prohibited the use of shoddy, even when sterilized, in the manufacture of bedding materials, was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate due process.
A New Mexico law that forbade insurance companies authorized to do business in that state to pay any nonresident any fee for the obtaining or placing of any policies covering risks in New Mexico violated due process because it attempted to control conduct beyond the jurisdiction of New Mexico.
Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Brandeis, Sanford. An Oklahoma inheritance tax law, applied to inheritance by Indians of Indian lands as determined by federal law, was void as a tax on a federal instrumentality.
Acts of New York of and authorizing New York City to erect piers over submerged lots impaired the obligation of contract as embraced in deeds to such submerged lots conveyed to private owners for valuable consideration through deeds executed by New York City in Act of New York of that authorized New York City to construct certain harbor improvements impaired the obligation of contract embraced in prior deeds to grantees whereunder the latter were accorded the privilege of filling in their underwater lots and constructing piers thereover.
A California law that provided that private carriers by automobile for hire could not operate over California highways between fixed points in the state without obtaining a certificate of convenience and submitting to regulation as common carriers exacted an unconstitutional condition and effected a denial of due process.
An Oklahoma law that levied an ad valorem tax on ores mined and in bins on the land was void as a tax on federal instrumentality when applied to a lessee of Indian land leased with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Brandeis. A Minnesota law levying personal property tax could not be collected on logs cut in Minnesota pursuant to a contract of sale for delivery in Michigan while they were in transit in interstate commerce by a route from Minnesota to Michigan.
A North Carolina inheritance tax law could not validly be applied to property constituting a trust fund in Massachusetts established under the will of a Massachusetts resident and bestowing a power of appointment upon a North Carolina resident who exercised that power through a will made in North Carolina; the levy by a state of the tax on property beyond its jurisdiction violated due process.
A Pennsylvania law exacting a license from persons engaged in the state in the sale of steamship tickets and orders for transportation to or from foreign countries was void as imposing an undue burden on foreign commerce.
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Holmes, Stone. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Sanford. An Ohio law that compensated mayors serving as judges in minor prohibition offenses solely out of the fees and costs collected from defendants who were convicted violated due process.
Texas White Primary Law that barred Negroes from participation in Democratic party primary elections denied them the equal protection of the laws. A Minnesota law that punished anyone who discriminated between different localities of that state by buying dairy products in one locality at a higher price than was paid for the same commodities in another locality infringed liberty of contract as protected by the Due Process Clause. An Ohio law that destroyed assignability of a franchise previously granted to an electric company by a municipal ordinance impaired the obligation of contract.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis. A Kentucky law that imposed a franchise tax on railroad corporations was constitutionally defective and violated due process insofar as it was computed by including mileage outside the state that did not in any plain and intelligible way add to the value of the road and the rights exercised in Kentucky. Special assessments levied against a railroad by a road district pursuant to an Arkansas statute and based on real property and rolling stock and other personalty were unreasonably discriminatory and excessive and deprived the railroad of property without due process because other assessments for the same improvement were based solely on real property.
As construed and applied to an organization not shown to have advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts, the Kansas criminal syndicalism law violated due process. Because of the exception it contained, under which its prohibitions were not to apply to conduct engaged in by participants whenever necessary to obtain a reasonable profit from products traded in, the Colorado Antitrust Law was void for want of a fixed standard for determining guilt and a violation of due process.
As applied to a foreign corporation having a fixed place of business and an agent in one county, but no property, debts or anything also in the county in which it was sued, Arkansas law that authorized actions to be brought against a foreign corporation in any county in the state, while restricting actions against domestic corporations to the county where it had a place of business or where its chief officer resided, deprived the foreign corporation of equal protection of the laws.
A Wisconsin law levying a tax on the gross income of domestic insurance companies was void where the income was derived in part as interest on United States bonds. A New Jersey statute that provided that in suits by residents against nonresidents for injuries resulting from operation of motor vehicles by the latter, service might be made on the Secretary of State as their agent, but that failed to provide any assurance that notice of such service would be communicated to the nonresidents, violated due process.
Justices concurring: Taft, C. Accord: Consolidated Flour Mills Co. Muegge , U. Property taxes assessed under New Jersey law on land acquired from the United States Housing Corporation by private purchasers subject to retention of mortgage by the federal agency could not be collected by sale of the land unless the federal liens were excluded and preserved as prior liens.
State and city taxes authorized under laws of Virginia may not be levied on the corpus of a trust located in Maryland, the income from which accrued to a beneficiary resident in Virginia; the corpus was beyond the jurisdiction of Virginia and accordingly the assessments violated due process. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Sanford, Stone. A Massachusetts income tax law could not validly be imposed on income received by a citizen as royalties for the use of patents issued by the United States.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Sutherland, Stone. Accord: Graysburg Oil Co. Texas , U. A New Jersey law empowering the Secretary of Labor to fix the fees charged by employment agencies violated due process because the regulation was not imposed on a business affected with a public interest. Justices concurring: Sutherland, Taft, C. A Pennsylvania law that taxed gross receipts of foreign and domestic corporations derived from intrastate operation of taxicabs, but exempted like receipts derived by individuals and partnerships, denied equal protection of the laws.
The Louisiana Shrimp Act, which permitted shipment of shrimp taken in Louisiana tidal waters only if the heads and hulls had previously been removed, and which was designed to favor the canning in Louisiana of shrimp destined for the interstate market, was unconstitutional; those taking the shrimp immediately became entitled to ship them in interstate commerce.
Accord: Johnson v. Haydel , U. A Pennsylvania law that prohibited corporate ownership of a drug store unless all of the stockholders were licensed pharmacists had no reasonable relationship to public health and therefore violated due process. A Tennessee law that fixed the prices at which gasoline may be sold violated due process because the business sought to be regulated was not affected with a public interest.
Justice dissenting: Holmes. Where the local property of a foreign corporation and the part of its business transacted in the state, less than half of which was intrastate, were but small fractions of its entire property and its nationwide business, Washington law that taxed the corporation in the form of a filing fee and a license tax, both reckoned upon its authorized capital stock, was inoperative because it burdened interstate commerce and reached property beyond the state contrary to due process.
Indian courts have done so to enforce the human rights provisions of the Indian Constitution, but this is very unusual. Our Constitution makes it simple to bring cases before the courts. The only way to become President of the Republic of Kenya is to win an election or be Deputy President when the President dies or is removed , and to be sworn in according to the Constitution and law.
Anyone else who pretends to take the position of President could be said to be acting unconstitutionally. But in truth, they are simply doing something constitutionally meaningless.
Whether their behaviour is positively illegal cannot be decided just by reading the Constitution: We need to read the Penal Code. The Constitution does not make any behaviour a crime. A separate law does this. It might also make a person — or the state — liable to pay compensation to someone injured, particularly by a violation of the Bill of Rights. The Constitution makes it clear that awarding compensation is possible. If a court decides that something — a law, an appointment, and an action — is unconstitutional, they are — on the face of it — saying it is a legal nothing.
Sometimes that is reasonably straightforward. Eight sections of the Security Laws Amendment Act, , were declared unconstitutional early in The new rules had not been applied, so no complications were caused by ruling that they had no legal effect. But sometimes declaring unconstitutional a law that has been used for some time might cause problems — what about things that had already been done innocently relying on that law?
A fascinating Canadian example, the Supreme Court declared that all laws of the Province of Manitoba were invalid because they were only in English not also French.
The Court suspended the order for two years to allow the province to fix the problem, and avoid everything done under the authority of statutes for many years being a legal nullity. In December , the Kenyan High Court declared regulations made by the Ministry of Lands invalid for lack of consultation with the National Land Commission and lack of public participation both constitutional requirements.
However, the court suspended the impact of the decision for one year to enable the proper procedure to be used. It seems that the Ministry has not managed to put things right in that year. The party must promptly file and serve the notice of constitutional question. This notice requirement supplements the court's duty to certify a constitutional challenge to the United States Attorney General or state attorney general.
The notice of constitutional question will ensure that the attorney general is notified of constitutional challenges and has an opportunity to exercise the statutory right to intervene at the earliest possible point in the litigation. The court's certification obligation remains, and is the only notice when the constitutionality of a federal or state statute is drawn in question by means other than a party's pleading, written motion, or other paper. In Rule 5.
Unless the court sets a later time, the day period for intervention runs from the time a party files a notice of constitutional question or from the time the court certifies a constitutional challenge, whichever is earlier. The court may extend the [day] period on its own or on motion. Pretrial activities may continue without interruption during the intervention period, and the court retains authority to grant interlocutory relief.
The court may reject a constitutional challenge to a statute at any time. But the court may not enter a final judgment holding a statute unconstitutional before the attorney general has responded or the intervention period has expired without response. This rule does not displace any of the statutory or rule procedures that permit dismissal of all or part of an action—including a constitutional challenge—at any time, even before service of process. Changes Made After Publication and Comment. The changes were made in response to public comments and Advisory Committee discussion.
The Advisory Committee debated at length the question whether the party who files a notice of constitutional question should be required to serve the notice on the appropriate attorney general.
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